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論　説
Article ₉ and the History of Japan＇s Judiciary:  
Examining Its Likeness to American and German Courts
Yuichiro TSUJI＊
 After the Abe Administration＇s interpretation of Article ₉ of the Japanese Constitution 
in ₂₀₁₄, questions have been raised regarding whether the likeness of the Japanese Supreme 
Court is closer to U.S. or German constitutional courts.
 The Japanese administration has long held the view that Article ₉ of the Japanese 
Constitution permitted only individual defense, not collective defense power. The Abe 
cabinet changed the head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau in ₂₀₁₃ and made an ofﬁcial 
announcement concerning its interpretation of Article ₉ of the Japanese Constitution in 
₂₀₁₄. The Self-Defense Force (Jieitai, SDF) is now able to exercise collective defense 
power. This change did not involve an amendment to the Japanese Constitution.
 The National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai), the predecessor of the Self-Defense 
Force, was established just before Japan gained its independence in ₁₉₅₂ by signing the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty. Mosaburo Suzuki, head of the Japanese Socialist Party, brought suit 
directly to the Supreme Court. In ₁₉₅₂, the Supreme Court dismissed his suit on the grounds 
that he lacked standing because he was only the head of a political party and no injury was 
in fact caused by the establishment of the National Police Reserve; the court announced its 
position as a U.S.-type judiciary. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, judicial review was stipulated 
＊　Yuichiro TSUJI, Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
(legal major and international regional studies major) at the University of Tsukuba. J.S.D University 
of California, Berkeley (₂₀₀₆). LL.M. University of California, Berkeley (₂₀₀₅). Master of Law, 
Kyoto University. The preceding discussion of this paper was published as Constitutional 
Amendment, ₃₇ Nanzan Review of American Studies ₅₁ (₂₀₁₅), and as Constitutional Law Court in 
Japan, ₆₆ Tsukuba Journal of Law and Politics ₆₅ (₂₀₁₆). 
 　This paper was modiﬁed after presentation international symposium on Thursday and Friday, ₁₉th 
& ₂₀th May ₂₀₁₆ for Asian Perspectives on Legal Globalization ₁₃th Asian Law Institute 
Conference at Peking University Law School, People＇s Republic of China. I thank all the people who 
worked and attended this symposium. 
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in Article ₈₁ of the Japanese Constitution, but the terms of the case and controversy were 
not included. The dispute on the law was written only in the Japanese Court Act.
 Almost ₇₀ years after the Japanese Constitution was promulgated in ₁₉₄₇, some 
Japanese constitutional scholars have been considering why the Japanese Supreme Court 
has not exercised its judicial power in the same manner as the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
Japanese Supreme Court has only ruled about ₁₀ cases as unconstitutional on their face, 
while ₁₂ cases were declared unconstitutional on application. Japanese scholars in the past 
as well as today have discussed the prospect of establishing a constitutional law court in 
Japan.
 In this paper, I will ﬁrst describe the history of the draft of the Japanese Constitution, 
and the reasons why the Japanese Constitution did not include the terms of the case and 
controversy as in Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
 Second, the possibility of the birth of a German-type Constitutional Court in Japan is 
reviewed. By simply amending the Court Act, the Japanese judiciary could become a 
German-type constitutional court. Alternatively, if we believe the core responsibility of the 
judiciary according to the Japanese Constitution is to adjudicate adversarial arguments, to 
adopt a German-type constitutional court would entail amending the Japanese Constitution. 
 Third, I will introduce the current defense and security statutes against which some 
Japanese constitutional law scholars are.
 Lastly, I review several perspectives of Japanese constitutional law scholars regarding 
the peace and defense statutes passed in ₂₀₁₅. 
I. History of Article 9
1. The History of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution 
 The Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyu Minshu Tou, LDP) has criticized the Japanese 
Constitution because the party felt that the General Headquarters of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), forced the Japanese government to adopt 
it as the new Japanese Constitution in ₁₉₄₆.1
1 　The current Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November ₃, ₁₉₄₆ and took effect on 
March ₃, ₁₉₄₇.
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 The drafting history of the Japanese Constitution occurred in two steps. The ﬁrst step 
was from August ₁₄, ₁₉₄₅ to February ₁₃, ₁₉₄₆ when Japan accepted the Potsdam 
Declaration in the MacArthur note. The second stage was from the date of the MacArthur 
note through November ₃, ₁₉₄₇.2
 The Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August ₁₄, ₁₉₄₅ after 
two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August ₆ and ₉. In classes 
on Japanese Constitutional Law, students are taught that the Potsdam Declaration required 
the Japanese government to surrender its armed forces and establish a peaceful and 
responsible government according to the will of the Japanese people. Government ofﬁcials 
did not understand its actual meaning at that time.3
 On October ₄, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur, 
issued the ＂Civil Liberties Directive,＂ which abolished the Maintenance of the Public Order 
Act (Chian Iji Hou), acquitted political criminals, legalized criticism of the Emperor, and 
repealed the thought police. Giving up on the pursuit of these issues, the Higashi 
Kuninomiya Cabinet resigned on October ₅, ₁₉₄₅.
 On October ₁₁, MacArthur suggested to the new Prime Minister, Kijuro Shidehara, 
that the Imperial Constitution (Meiji Constitution) be liberalized. Shidehara established the 
Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee (Kenpo Mondai Chosa Iinnkai, the 
Matsumoto Committee) to draft a new Constitution.4 Its Chairman, Joji Matsumoto, drafted 
2 　The origin and history of the Japanese Constitution in English. Birth of the Constitution of Japan 
[English]. < http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/index.html >. (last visited on February ₂₆, ₂₀₁₆).
 　JOHN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW ₁₇₇ (University of Georgia Press ₂₀₀₆).
 　Hideo Tanaka, A History of the Constitution of Japan of ₁₉₄₆ , HIDEO TANAKA & MALCOM 
SMITH, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM ₆₅₃-(University ot Tokyo Press ₁₉₇₆).
 　Lawrence Beer, Peace in Theory and Practice under Article ₉  of Japan＇ s Constitution, ₈₁ 
Marquette Law Review ₈₁ (₁₉₉₈).
3 　TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPO SEIRITSUSI, VOL. I [The History of the Constitution of 
Japan, Vol. I] ₈-₃₁ (Yuhikaku ₁₉₆₂) [hereinafter KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL.I ]. The serious concern 
of Japanese government was to maintain ＂Kokutai.＂
 　NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPO [Constitution] ₂₈ (Iwanami Shoten ₂₀₁₅) [hereinafter ASHIBE 
KENPO]. This book is currently being edited by Prof. Kazuyuki Takahashi as Prof. Ashibe passed 
away in ₁₉₉₉.
4 　KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL.I, supra note ₃ at ₂₅₂-₃₇₄ .
 　The advisors of the Matsumoto Committee were Tatsukichi Minobe, Toru Simizu, and Junji 
Nomura who were constitutional and administrative scholars. The members were Toshiro Irie and 
Isao Sato. Drafting a new constitution was not the original aim of this committee.
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a document called the Gist of the Revision of the Constitution.5 On February ₁, ₁₉₄₆, this 
draft was published by the Mainichi Newspaper. Surprised by its old-fashioned nature,6 
MacArthur ordered the establishment of a task force to draft a new Constitution on February 
₃. On February ₈, when the government＇s drafts of the new Constitution were rejected, a 
draft by the GHQ in English was submitted to Joji Matsumoto. When MacArthur ordered 
General Courtney Whitney to draft a new Constitution on February ₂-₃, he noted three 
important points that were to be considered in the new Constitution. These points are known 
as the MacArthur note.7
 The ﬁrst point was that the emperor ＂was at the head of the state. His succession is 
dynastic. His duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and 
responsive to the basic will of the people as provided therein.＂
 Second, ＂[w]ar as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an 
instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies 
upon the higher ideals that are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection. No 
Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will 
ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.＂
 Third, ＂[t]he feudal system of Japan will cease. No rights of peerage except those of the 
Imperial Family will extend beyond the lives of those now existent. No patent of nobility 
will from this time forth embody within itself any National or Civic power of government.＂
 The Liberal Democratic Party was established in ₁₉₅₅ by merging the Liberal Party 
(Jiyu Tou) and the Japanese Democratic Party (Nihon Minshu Tou). Its party platform was to 
create its own constitution. Those who are against the current Japanese Constitution think 
5 　This committee put forth two drafts.
 　TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPO SEIRITSUSI, VOL. II [The History of the Constitution of 
Japan, Vol. II] ₄₈₅-₆₄₆ (Yuhikaku ₁₉₇₄) [hereinafter KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. II ]. 
6 　This Gist of the Revision of the Constitution included four principles. First, the basic principle 
expressing the Emperor＇s sovereignty was not changed. Second, the power of the parliament was 
expanded, thus diminishing the control of the Emperor. Third, the responsibilities of the Ministries 
were expanded to cover all national politics. Fourth, the protection of rights of the people was 
strengthened. 
7 　KENZO TAKAYANAGI, ICHIRO OHTOMO, and HIDEO TANAKA, NIHONKOKU KENPO 
SEITEI NO KATEI [The Making of the Constitution of Japan, Vol. I Documents] ₉₉ (Yuhikaku ₁₉₉₅) 
[hereinafter TAKAYANAGI ET.AL VOL.I ].
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that the process was undemocratic and that it was imposed by the GHQ.8 The Japanese 
constitutional research opposes the LDP＇s position for the following reasons.9
 First, not only the Gist of the Revision of the Constitution but also other drafts of the 
constitution were introduced by constitutional scholars from the end of ₁₉₄₅ through the 
beginning of ₁₉₄₆.10 An example is the ＂Outline of the Constitution Draft,＂ which was 
submitted by the Constitution Investigation Association (Kenpo Kenkyukai); this 
organization was established upon the suggestion of Iwasaburo Takano and Anzo Suzuki in 
₁₉₄₅. It was not a governmental draft but purely a private draft that was more advanced than 
the current constitution. The sovereignty of the people, a list of fundamental rights, and a 
list of social rights were included. It was translated into English and submitted to the GHQ.11
 Second, research on constitutional drafts began in ₁₉₄₅. The current constitution had a 
list of inalienable rights and included the principle of the people＇s sovereignty, which is a 
universal principle around the world.12
 The GHQ and the Japanese government had several meetings and ﬁnished their draft 
on March ₂ (their project was called the March ₂  Draft). The Japanese government brought 
the draft to the GHQ. The ＂Outline of a Draft for a Revised Constitution＂ was completed on 
March ₆. The ＂Draft for a Revised Constitution＂ (March ₆  Draft) was published on March ₇ 
in newspaper. The Japanese people were surprised by this very democratic draft but 
generally welcomed it.13 
 The general election of the Imperial Diet under universal suffrage occurred on April 
8 　MAKOTO OHISHI, NIHON KOKU KENPOU SI [History of the Japanese Constitution] ₃₅₅ 
(Yuhikaku ₂₀₀₅) [hereinafter OHISHI]. Prof. Ohishi believes that the GHQ imposed the constitution 
on the Japanese government. According to his analysis, the MacArthur note and his draft form the 
model for Article ₉ and became grounds for the SDF.
9 　ASHIBE KENPO, supra note ₃ at ₂₅.
10　KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. II, supra note ₅ at ₇₃₃-₈₈₄ . 
 　TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI, and 
KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPO I [Constitution I] ₅₆ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂) [hereinafter NONAKA ET 
AL.I ].
11　Iwasaburo Takano was not satisfied with The Outline of the Constitution Draft and separately 
drafted his own republican constitution that stated the head of the state was to be the president. 
KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. II, supra note ₅ at ₇₈₄-₈₆₀.
12　KOJI SATO, KENPO [Constitution] ₆₆ (Seibundo ₂₀₁₁) [hereinafter KOJI SATO ].
13　ASHIBE KENPO, supra note ₃ at ₂₈-₂₉. 
 　TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPO SEIRITSUSI, VOL. III [The History of the Constitution 
of Japan, Vol. III] ₂₀₀-₂₀₉ (Yuhikaku ₁₉₇₄) [hereinafter KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. III].
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₁₀, ₁₉₄₆.14 This April election was also involved a vote by the people to approve the a 
＂Draft for a Revised Constitution＂ (March ₆  Draft).15
 After the general election, ＂Kenpo Kaisei Soan＂ (April ₁₇  Draft, Final Draft of 
Japanese Constitution) was published. It was submitted to the Privy Council.16 In 
accordance with Article ₇₃17 for the amendment of the Meiji Constitution, it was approved 
in the House of Representatives on August ₂₄ and the House of the Peers on October ₆.18
2. Drafting history and the Self-Defense Force 
 The drafting history is not conclusive evidence for the interpretation of the Japanese 
Constitution but it might inﬂuence the interpretation of a particular Article of the Japanese 
Constitution.
 Article ₉ of the Draft for a Revised Constitution had no second paragraph in the ＂Kenpo 
Kaisei Soan＂ (April ₁₇  Draft). An important modiﬁcation in the second paragraph of Article 
₉ was made during a discussion in the Imperial Diet. In August, in a subcommittee meeting 
of the Committee on the Bill for Revision of the Imperial Constitution in the House of 
Representatives, Chairman Hitoshi Ashida added the text, ＂to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph＂ in the second paragraph of Article ₉.19
14　Public ofﬁcials were purged from public service on January ₄, ₁₉₄₆.
15　The U.S. State Department was not in favor of this proposal and instead argued that a stronger 
executive branch should be established. 
16　KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. III, supra note ₁₃ at ₃₄₉-₄₃₂.
 　Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara introduced the draft at a meeting of the Privy Council in March. 
Dainihon Teikoku Kenpo [Meiji Kenpo, Meiji Constitution], Art. ₇₃. When it becomes necessary in 
the future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a draft to that effect shall be submitted 
to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order. (₂) In the above case, neither house can initiate the debate 
unless two thirds or more of all Members are present, and no amendment can be passed unless a 
majority of two thirds or more of the Members present is obtained.
17　Dainihon Teikoku Kenpo [Meiji Constitution, Constitution of the Empire of Japan], Art. ₇₃.
18　OHISHI, supra note ₈ at ₃₅₆-₃₅₇. Prof. Ohishi believes that the drafting history shows legal 
defects in the establishment of the Japanese Constitution.
19　TATSUO SATO, NIHONKOKU KENPO SEIRITSUSI, VOL. IV [The History of the Constitution of 
Japan, Vol. IV] ₅₈₈-₅₉₈,₇₈₈-₇₉₄,₈₅₇-₈₅₈ (Yuhikaku ₁₉₉₄). Tatsuo Sato took detailed note for 
Article ₉ draft [hereinafter KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. IV ] 
 　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₉. Aspiring to international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat 
or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
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 Prime minister Shigeru Yoshida mentioned in the plenary session in June, ₁₉₄₅ that 
paragraph ₁ waiver war even for self- defense because war has been occurred in the name of 
self-defense and Japan could not have armed force.
 In a meeting of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), the Chinese delegation pointed out 
that this text might justify the formation of a Japanese army.20 Thus, the House of Peers 
added Article ₆₆,21 the civilian requirement.
 The amendment by Ashida provided justification for the government to maintain a 
minimum ability to defend itself with a Self-Defense Force (Jieitai).22 Language to this 
effect was added by the Imperial Parliament. 
3. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau and the students of Anzo Suzuki
 The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Naikaku Housei Kyoku, CLB), was originally formed 
under the Meiji Constitution. It was formerly under the Ministry of Justice but is now under 
the Cabinet. Its most senior ofﬁcial is not a minister, but rather a chief. The CLB monitors 
bills submitted by the ministries and has been charged with the public interpretation of the 
Japanese Constitution since the Japanese Constitution was ratiﬁed.23 There is no mention of 
the CLB in the Japanese Constitution.
 Japanese governmental interpretation endorsed the power of self-defense as a power of 
sovereignty in the famous Sunagawa case.24 The CLB explained that individual defense and 
20　KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. IV, supra note ₁₉ at ₉₁₈-₉₃₁.
 　RICHARD FINN, WINNERS IN PEACE: MACARTHUR, YOSHIDA AND POSTWAR JAPAN ₁₁₅- 
(Berkeley, University of California Press ₁₉₉₂).
21　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₆₆(₂). The Prime Minister and other Ministers of 
State must be civilians. 
22　NONAKA ET AL. I, supra note ₁₀ at ₁₆₄.
 　KOJI SATO, supra note ₁₂  at ₉₃ .
 　KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. IV, supra note ₁₉ at ₇₈₉-.
23　MASAHIRO SAKATA, SEIHU NO KENPO KAISHAKU [Constitutional Interpretation by the 
Government] ₁-₆ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₃) [hereinafter SAKATA].
 　THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW, supra note ₂ at ₃₅.
24　Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct] Dec. ₁₆, ₁₉₅₉, Showa ₃₄(a) no. ₇₁₀, ₁₃ Saiko Saibansho Keiji 
Hanreishu [Keishu] ₃₂₂₅.
 　KOJI SATO, supra note ₁₂  at ₉₄ . 
 　Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan, ₆₆ Tsukuba Journal Law and Politics ₆₅,₈₄ 
(₂₀₁₆).
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collective defense powers were noted in Article ₅₁25 of the Charters of the United Nations. 
The Japanese Constitution only permitted individual defense power as collective defense 
power was unconstitutional because it could involve Japan in unnecessary disputes. The 
CLB divided ＂war＂ into invasive and defensive war. The term ＂renounce war＂ in the ﬁrst 
paragraph of Article ₉ meant that the Japanese government waived invasive war and the 
wording ＂[i]n order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph＂ meant in order to 
accomplish the waiver of invasive war26 while permitting the Japanese government to 
maintain a minimum ability to defend itself. These were the constitutional interpretations 
regarding the Self-Defense Force.
 The students of Anzo Suzuki became professors of constitutional law at several 
universities throughout Japan.27 They have had different interpretations of Article ₉. Most of 
them argued that ＂renounce＂ in paragraph one of Article ₉ meant all war was waived. Wars 
occur in history as a means to solve international disputes. Both defense and invasive war 
should be prohibited. Some argued that motivation for war and ＂the threat or use of force＂ 
were too difﬁcult to divide into either self-defense or invasive or aggressive wars. It was too 
difﬁcult to follow the Pact of Paris of ₁₉₂₈.28 
 These scholars thought that the Charter of the United Nations prohibited all war other 
than that which resulted from self-defense. Facing aggressive or invasive war, the U.N. 
Armed Forces was organized to protect invaded nations but Article ₉ prohibited the Japanese 
government from participating in the U.N. Armed Forces because Japan lost World War II.
 This idea follows the principle of collective security under the U.N. They explained 
that the Japanese government＇s punishment for World War II was the inability for that 
25　Article ₅₁ of the Charter of the United Nations states, ＂Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.＂
26　Prof. Koji Sato holds the position that this interpretation is in line with the MacArthur draft and the 
subsequent draft submitted in the Imperial Diet. 
 　KOJI SATO, supra note ₁₂ at ₉₄.
27　Association for the Study of Constitutional Theory, Kenpo Riron Kenkyu Kai was established in 
₁₉₆₄. See http://kenriken.jp.net/ (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
28　NONAKA ET. AL. VOL.I, supra note ₁₀ at ₁₆₅.
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government to participate in the U.N. Armed Forces. Thus, some Japanese constitutional 
scholars criticized the pre-₂₀₁₄ public interpretation.
 They argued that there were no constitutional provisions other than Article ₆₆29 that 
permitted maintaining an army. The preamble to the Japanese Constitution30 expects the 
collective security provided by the U.N. Any interpretation permitting invasive war is 
contrary to the idea of paciﬁsm set forth in the preamble.
 Yasuo Hasebe proposed another interpretation that follows the pre-₂₀₁₄ public 
interpretation of the CLB.31 He argued that there are several ideas regarding methods to keep 
peace among the Japanese people. It is nonsense for him to think that there is no way for 
Japanese government to protect its people against attacks from foreign nations. The power 
to protect itself is only possible under the current Japanese Constitution. Regardless, the 
majority of Japanese constitutional law scholars are against the Abe cabinet decision of 
₂₀₁₄ to endorse collective defense power without amending the constitution (Kaishaku 
Kaiken).
 The history of drafting Article ₉ shows the importance of Article ₆₆, which contains 
civilian provisions. Regarding Article ₆₆, Katsutoshi Takami noted an important fact that 
during the drafting period from ₁₉₄₅ to ₁₉₄₆, a Japanese army did not exist.32 The proposal 
to provide an army of force in the new constitution meant that the Japanese government had 
to establish a new army at that time. Takami suggested that within the Matstumoto 
Committee there were camps for and against the provision of an army. The camp against the 
provision of an army won and this led to the current interpretational disputes of Article ₉.33 
29　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₆₆(₂).
30　See id. preamble, ＂trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.＂
 　NONAKA ET.AL.VOL.I, supra note ₁₀ at ₁₆₈-₇₃. 
31　YASUO HASEBE, KENPO TO HEIWA TO TOINAOSU [Question Again the Constitution and 
Peace] ₂₉-₄₂. (Chikumashinsho ₂₀₀₄).
 　YASUO HASEBE, KENPO [Constitution] ₆₉ (Sinseisha ₂₀₁₄).
32　KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, [KENPO ₉] Jou Kaishaku Tairitsu no Genryu [Origin and Development 
of Conﬂict of Interpretation of Article ₉], Institute of Comparative Law of Waseda University, Nihon 
Hou No Kokusai Teki Bunmyaku [International Context Of Japanese Law] ₂₅₈ (Waseda University 
₂₀₀₅).
33　KOJI TONAMI, Takami Houkoku heno Komento [Comment to the Takami Report], Institute of 
Comparative Law of Waseda University, Nihon Hou No Kokusai Teki Bunmyaku [International 
Context of Japanese Law] ₂₇₉ (Waseda University ₂₀₀₅). 
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4. National Security Council under the Abe Cabinet
 The ﬁrst Abe Administration planned to establish a National Security Council (NSC) 
but Abe resigned in August ₂₀₀₇. After regaining power in December ₂₀₁₂ from the 
Democratic Party, he issued the Proactive Contribution to Peace (Sekkyoku teki Heiwa 
shugi)34 and changed the prior CLB＇s public interpretation of the Japanese Constitution. 
According to Abe, cooperation with other governments is vital to Japanese defense and 
security. Abe decided that a collective defense power should be established without 
amending the Japanese Constitution (Kaishaku Kaiken).
 In the NSC, four members of the Cabinet were summoned to work on the issue: the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary.35 The NSC follows the American NSC, and the cabinet is in charge of the 
diplomatic and national and security strategy (NSS).36 These four members weighed the 
issues surrounding the reorganization of the United States military stationed in Japan, the 
relationship with China, the North Korean missile issue, and territorial issues. Another ﬁve 
ministers were summoned to design the fundamental policy for national defense, the basic 
defense program, and responses to armed attack situations. The NSC ofﬁce is set up in the 
Cabinet Secretariat.37
 This move was analyzed in light of the Algerian hostage crisis of January ₂₀₁₃. The 
Asahi Shimbun38 and The Tokyo Shimbun39 published articles opining that that the 
establishment of the NSC was too hasty at that time and that existing organizations and 
procedures would easily handle disasters and crisis situations.
34　Ministry of Defense, The Proactive Contribution to Peace. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/security/ (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
35　Ministry of Defense, Information on the National Security Council. Available at http://www.mofa.
go.jp/fp/nsp/page₁we_₀₀₀₀₈₀.html (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
36　Ministry of Defense, Information on the National Security Strategy. Available at http://www.mofa.
go.jp/fp/nsp/page₁we_₀₀₀₀₈₁.html (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
37　Id.
38　Jieitai no Houjin Kyushutsu Genba ni Nandai Buki Siyou Dokomade [Difﬁcult Problems for the 
SDF Rescue Mission for Japanese, the Standards for Weapon Use], The Asahi Shimbun, (February 
₂₀, ₂₀₁₅). Available at 
 　http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASH₂K₀₆₂₄H₂JUTFK₀₀S.html (last visited on December ₂₆, 
₂₀₁₅).
39　Editorial, Houjin Yuso Minaoshi [Review of Japanese Transportation], The Tokyo Shimbun, 
(February ₄, ₂₀₁₃).
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 The Abe Administration might have considered the NSC to be a vehicle of civilian 
control. This might be true if we understand that the core of civilian control in Article ₆₆(₂) 
is legislation. Nonetheless, accountability by the NSC would still be questioned if public 
access was too primitive.
 In ₂₀₁₅, the following new examination agenda items were added: measures against 
Sonritsu Kiki Jitai, measures against Juyo Eikyo Jitai, and international peace collaboration 
missions. The NSC needed to deliberate on determinations or changes to the implementation 
programs for securing safety, on Kaketsuke Keigo for international peace collaboration 
missions, and on sending SDF ofﬁcers to assist with other countries for U.N. peace-keeping 
operations. These issues will be discussed in Chapter III.
5. Japanese constitutional law scholars’ theories on Article 9
 Before the ₂₀₁₄ Abe Cabinet decision, some constitutional scholars who were students 
of Anzo Suzuki thought that the SDF could be considered an ＂army＂ as prohibited by Article 
₉. They felt that expanding the scope and power of the SDF was unconstitutional. Article ₉ 
was to be amended if the government strengthened the current level of the SDF.
 Kazuyuki Takahashi40 explains that Article ₉ is balanced with constitutionalism. He 
does not believe that Article ₉ is simply an advisory provision with no legal teeth. If Article 
₉ is a political indicator with no legal force,41 then it is powerless even in the political 
sphere. Using the political question doctrine, the court can avoid determining the 
constitutionality of the SDF. Takahashi added that the anti-democratic nature of the political 
question doctrine should provide standing for a plaintiff asking for a remedy but the case 
was dismissed.42
40　KAZYUKI TAKAHASHI, RIKKENSHUGI TO NIHONKOKUKENPO [Constitutionalism and the 
Constitution of Japan] ₆₃ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₃).
41　MASAMI ITO, KENPO [Constitution] ₁₆₈-₉₉ (Koubundou ₁₉₉₅). Prof. Ito explains that Article 
₉ is a political norm not a legal norm. 
42　There is controversy over the scope of the political question doctrine in Japan. ISAO SATO, 
KENPO KAISHAKU NO SHOMONDAI [Constitutional Interpretation Problems] ₁₃₆-₁₃₇ 
(Yuhikaku ₁₉₆₂). Prof. Isao Sato noted that there was no specific standard for ＂clearly obvious 
unconstitutionality or invalidity＂ in the Sunagawa case. Isao Sato argued that using the political 
question doctrine had no justiﬁcation in the Sunagawa decision. He imagined that the Supreme Court 
might have wanted to put limitations on the political question doctrine. Isao Sato supports a narrow 
scope for the political question doctrine. This argument will be analyzed in Yuichiro Tsuji＇s upcoming 
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 Yasuaki Ohnuma43 expects that a world government will emerge in the future but that 
the constitutional issue should not be based on an idealistic view of a world government. 
Under the current sovereign governmental regime, any U.N. resolution has legitimacy 
worldwide. An action by the U.N. is similar to an international policing action. The Japanese 
SDF may operate under a directive of the U.N. when it performs police actions but not when 
it performs military actions. Asaho Mizushima also discussed the nature of police actions.44 
 Since the Japanese Constitution was promulgated, judicial review in Japan has been 
inﬂuenced by U.S. and European constitutional studies and has developed through several 
cases regarding the constitutionality of the SDF. 
II. The Constitutional Court in Japan
 Compared to the U.S. Constitution, there have been few unconstitutional decisions in 
the Japanese Supreme Court since the Japanese Constitution was ratiﬁed.45 One approach 
was to establish a Constitutional Court with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional issues 
in the Japanese judiciary. 
 In Germany after World War II, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesvefassungsgericht, BVerfG) was established under the Basic Law46 and is the only 
court that may declare statutes unconstitutional under the Basic Law. This may be 
Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review (₂₀₁₆). 
 　Taisuke Kamata, Adjudication and the Governing Process; Political Questions and Legislative 
Discretion, PERCY LUNEY AND KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI, JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW ₁₅₆-₁₅₇ (University of Tokyo Press ₁₉₉₃).
43　Yasuaki Ohnuma, Comment Regarding the Reality of the International Society and the 
Establishment of International Peace During the Commission on the Constitution, House of 
Councilors. Available at http://www.kenpoushinsa.sangiin.go.jp/kenpou/houkokusyo/
hatugen/₀₃_₀₅_₀₅_₀₁.html (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
44　Asaho Mizushima, Comment Regarding Reality of the International Society and the Establishment 
of International Peace During the Commission on the Constitution, House of Councilors. Available at 
http://www.kenpoushinsa.sangiin.go.jp/kenpou/houkokusyo/hatugen/₀₃_₀₅_₀₅_₀₁.html (last visited 
on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆). Prof. Mizushima argues that Japan must observe the international rule of law 
independent of the United States. 
45　MASAMI ITO, SAIBANKAN TO GAKUSHA NO AIDA [Between Justice and Scholar] ₁₀₆-₁₃₇ 
(Yuhikaku ₁₉₉₃).
 　Tsuji, supra note ₂₄ at ₈₆.
46　Grundgesetz fur Die Bundersrepubrik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May ₂₃, 
₁₉₄₉, NGNI.I (Ger).
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accomplished in various ways such as abstract judicial review. Only a limited group of 
applicants may ﬁle applications for an abstract review of a statute.47
 These proceedings involve the review of a statute＇s constitutionality under all relevant 
aspects regardless of the speciﬁc legal dispute or whether or not the applicant is affected. 
The proceedings are regulated under Article ₉₃ of the Basic Law48 and under speciﬁc articles 
of the Federal Constitutional Court Act.49
 Proceedings of this type may be recognized by their ＂BvF＂ ﬁle reference. Generally 
speaking, only very few proceedings for the judicial review of statutes are initiated. 
However, almost all of these proceedings are of major importance. 
 A specific judicial review of statutes can also be conducted. Only the Federal 
Constitutional Court is competent to determine the constitutionality of laws. If another court 
considers a law to be unconstitutional and the validity of said law is material to the decision, 
it suspends the proceedings and refers the matter to the Federal Constitutional Court for a 
determination. 
 This type of proceeding is therefore also known as judicial referral and is regulated 
under the Basic Law50 and the Federal Constitutional Court Act.51 These proceedings can be 
recognized by their ＂BvL＂ ﬁle reference. 
 A constitutional complaint may be lodged by any natural or legal person if they believe 
that their fundamental rights52 or speciﬁc rights that are equivalent to fundamental rights53 
have been violated by the German public authority.
 A constitutional complaint makes it possible for citizens to assert their freedoms as 
guaranteed under the constitution vis-à-vis the state. 
47　More information on the abstract  review of statutes is  available at  http:/ /www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/Wichtige-Verfahrensarten/Abstrakte-Normenkontrolle/
abstrakte-normenkontrolle_node.html 
 　(last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆). See also, Rudolf Streinz, The Role of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, Law and Politics, ₃₁ Ritsumeikan Law Review ₉₅ (₂₀₁₄).
48　Grundgesetz, [GG] [Constitution] Art. ₉₃(₁) (Ger).
49　Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act] Art. ₇₆, ₉₃ et 
seq. (Ger).
50　Grundgesetz, [GG] [Constitution] Art. ₁₀₀(₁) (Ger).
51　Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act] Art. ₈₀ et seq. 
(Ger).
52　Grundgesetz, [GG] [Constitution] Art. ₁ to Art. ₁₉ (Ger).
53　Grundgesetz, [GG] [Constitution] Art. ₂₀ (₄), Arts. ₃₃, ₃₈, ₁₀₁, ₁₀₃, and ₁₀₄ (Ger).
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 These German Federal Constitutional Court procedures are set forth in the Basic Law 
and the Federal Constitutional Court Act in detail. The procedures for the Japanese 
counterpart are not found Japanese Constitution.
1. Drafting history and the Court Act 
 The officers at GHQ from the U.S. were engaged in the drafting process of the 
Japanese Constitution. The phrase ＂case and controversy＂ was not found in the GHQ draft 
of February ₁₃, ₁₉₄₆. Three GHQ members and U.S. lawyers, Milo Rowell, Alfred Hussey, 
Jr., and Margaret Stone, worked on the judiciary chapter. The records show that there was 
not strong pressure for a special tribunal to preside over the constitutional law court at that 
time. The primary concerns were the people＇s sovereignty, the Emperor as a symbol, and 
demilitarization.
 After accepting the Potsdam Declaration, for example, the government established a 
committee for judicial reform on November ₉, ₁₉₄₅. It reviewed the democratization of the 
judiciary and found that the prosecutor＇s office should move from the judiciary to the 
Ministry of Justice because the investigation infringed on the rights of the people.54
 Section ₂₂₈ (c) (₃) of the SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) 
provided that the Emperor and the Supreme Commander should ensure ＂[t]hat any other 
bodies shall possess only temporary veto power [Emphasis by author] over legislative 
measures, including constitutional amendments approved by the representative legislative 
body, and that such body shall have sole authority over ﬁnancial measures.＂55
 The GHQ draft of February ₁₃, ₁₉₄₆ reﬂected the discussions of the lawyers in the 
Government Section (GS), especially Rowell, who participated in a small drafting 
committee for the chapter on the judiciary. 
 The term ＂temporary veto power＂ in SWNCC-₂₂₈ meant that the legislative body was 
to be strong. In discussing the GS, some argued that more than temporary veto power in the 
Supreme Court should be rejected. 
 The records states ＂Colonial Kades felt that SWNCC-₂₂₈ limited us to granting only a 
temporary power of veto to the Supreme Court. Commander Hussey stated that [this 
54　KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. I, supra note ₃ at ₄₀₀-₄₀₂. 
55　TAKAYANAGI ET.AL VOL. I, supra note ₇ at ₁₂₃, ₄₁₃, ₄₃₃.
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limitation applied only to the Supreme Court＇s legislative veto, and that] we are warranted in 
giving the Supreme Court absolute power of review over questions of constitutional 
interpretation.＂56
 This discussion concluded that giving veto power to the Supreme Court for its review 
of legislation without a concrete dispute was against SWNCC-₂₈₃ and that the Supreme 
Court was able to resolve constitutional interpretation issues in concrete disputes over the 
authority of the legislative body.57
 Other records indicated that the oligarchy of the judiciary might distort the legislative 
body with judicial review, but this was not a concern because the power of the legislature 
was strengthened in this draft. Rowell later noted that judicial review and the experience of 
the U.S. with the New Deal in the U.S. Supreme Court might be shocking to the Japanese 
people, combined with the principle that the court would be the supreme gatekeeper of the 
constitution with one legislative body as the highest power.58
 In ＂the Outline of the Constitution Draft＂, the non-governmental party drafts contained 
chapters on the judiciary. For example, the Liberal Party, the Communist Party (Kyosan 
Tou), the Japan Progressive Party (Shinpo Tou), and the Japanese Socialist Party (Nihon 
Shakai Tou) prepared constitutional drafts. Some of them stated that the Supreme Court 
should be the highest court and that it should manage all of inferior courts, and that the 
president of the Supreme Court should be publicly elected. This advanced draft did not 
mention disputes on laws.59
 The ＂Outline of the Constitution Draft＂ was prepared by the Constitution Investigation 
Association and had three versions. Two of these did not stipulate language regarding 
disputes on laws.60 The third draft provided for a special tribunal to preside over disputes 
regarding the power between governmental bodies. The head of this special tribunal was the 
president of the judiciary and judges were selected from among Supreme Court Judges, 
56　Id. at ₁₂₃.
57　KENZO TAKAYANAGI, ICHIRO OHTOMO, and HIDEO TANAKA, NIHONKOKU KENPO 
SEITEI NO KATEI [The Making of the Constitution of Japan, Vol. II Comments] ₂₃₀-₂₄₃ (Yuhikaku 
₁₉₉₅).
58　Id. at ₂₄₃.
59　KENPO SEIRITSUSI VOL. I, supra note ₃ at ₇₃₃-₈₈₄.
60　Id. at ₈₂₆ and ₈₂₉. It was not clear who submitted the ＂Outline of the Constitution Draft＂ to the 
GHQ.
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legislative members, and lawyers. 
 The discussion regarding the phrase ＂case and controversy＂ or disputes on laws61 
identical and was left for the next generation of Japanese constitutional law scholars to 
determine.
2. A case for the National Police Reserve and the possibility of a Constitutional 
Court 
 The National Police Reserve, the predecessor of the Self-Defense Force, was 
established just before Japan gained its independence in ₁₉₅₂ by concluding the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty. Mosaburo Suzuki, head of the Japanese Socialist Party, brought suit 
directly to the Supreme Court. In ₁₉₅₂, the Supreme Court62 dismissed his suit on the 
grounds that he lacked standing because he was only the head of a political party and no 
injury was caused by the establishment of the National Police Reserve; the Supreme Court 
announced its position as a U.S.-type judiciary. Unlike in the U.S. Constitution, judicial 
review was stipulated in Article ₈₁63 of the Japanese Constitution but the terms of a case and 
controversy were not included.64 Disputes on laws are only addressed in the Japanese Court 
Act.65
 Thus, if we take this decision seriously, it would be unconstitutional to establish a 
constitutional tribunal that has abstract judicial review and it would overturn this important 
constitutional precedent.
 The Court Act was revised in ₁₉₄₇ with the current Japanese Constitution. Around the 
61　In Japan, there is a controversy that if a dispute regarding a law is identical with a case and 
controversy as set forth in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 
 　Tsuji, supra note ₂₄ at ₇₅,₇₇.
62　Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] October ₈, ₁₉₅₂, Showa ₂₇ (ma) no. ₂₃, ₆(₉) Saiko Saibansho Minji 
Hanreishu [Minshu] ₇₈₃.
63　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₈₁. The Supreme Court is the court of last resort 
with the power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or ofﬁcial act.
64　SOUICHI SASAKI, KAITEI NIHONKOKUKENPO [Japanese Constitution, Revised] ₃₄₂-₃₃ and 
₃₅₆-₃₅₇ (Yuhikaku ₁₉₅₂). Prof. Sasaki explained how the judiciary would operate in a concrete 
case, that the judiciary should not be willing to solve constitutional interpretative issues without a 
case, and that judicial review operates under statute. Sasaki noted that the Supreme Court should 
exercise judicial review. 
65　Saibansho Hou [Japanese Court Act], Law No. ₄₈ of ₂₀₁₃, Art. ₃(₁) (Japan). Courts shall, except 
as speciﬁcally provided for in the Constitution of Japan, decide all legal disputes, and have such 
other powers as are speciﬁcally provided for by law.
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time of the establishment of the National Police Reserve, parliament discussed a proposal to 
amend the Court Act to delete the phrase ＂disputes on laws＂ and added a new procedure for 
abstract judicial review. This revision to the Court Act was submitted in ₁₉₅₇ and proposed 
a reorganization of the Supreme Court. In the beginning, the heavy burden of the Supreme 
Court was recognized. 
 Around ₁₉₅₅, several constitutional scholars proposed reforming the Supreme Court 
and Article ₈₁.66 Prof. Isao Sato argued that we should modify Article ₈₁ of the Japanese 
Constitution to include special procedures for a special constitutional tribunal to preside 
over constitutional interpretation cases if the Supreme Court was the only court that could 
review constitutional interpretation cases.67 Prof. Jorji Tagami noted that only the Diet, the 
executive branch, and the judiciary could bring constitutional interpretation litigation.68
 Prof. Kunitoshi Ohnishi suggested pre-review and Prof. Kenzo Takayanagi argued for 
advisory opinions from the Supreme Court and that it should be possible to establish a 
special branch in the Supreme Court like the German Constitutional Tribunal without 
amending the Japanese Constitution. Prof. Toshiyoshi Miyazawa＇s opinion was that the 
court＇s advisory opinions should be limited.69
 Prof. Anzo Suzuki agreed with the heavy burden of the Supreme Court, argued for a 
special branch for general appeals in the high court, and also argued that the Supreme Court 
should be the only court to render constitutional interpretation decisions.70
 The proposal to establish a special branch within the Supreme Court to exclusively 
review constitutional cases is similar to the certiorari system in the U.S. The heavy burden 
of routine cases in the Supreme Court resulted in the loss of to focus on important 
constitutional interpretation cases. Some constitutional scholars argued that this proposal 
was too old arguments at that time to justify today.71
66　NONAKA ET.AL. VOL. I, supra note ₁₀ at ₇₇-₇₈.
67　JISHU KENPO KISEI GIIN DOMEI, KENPO KAISEI NO MONDAITEN [The Problems with 
Amending the Constitution] ₅₃₆-₅₄₆, ₅₅₆ (₁₉₅₅).
68　Id.
69　Id.
70　Id.
71　HIDENORI TOMATSU, KENPO [Constitution] ₄₆₃ (Kobundo ₂₀₁₅). Tomatsu believes that only 
in the early stage of Japanese Constitution it was possible to think that the Japanese judiciary had 
abstract review until the National Police Reserve Case was rendered. 
 　MASATO ICHIKAWA, KENPO [Constitution] ₃₅₀ (Shinseisha ₂₀₁₄). Ichikawa and Tomatsu 
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 In ₂₀₀₅, the LDP submitted its own constitutional draft72 requesting the establishment 
of a constitutional court. Another draft73 in ₂₀₁₂ submitted by the LDP did not include 
provisions for a constitutional court. For those who oppose the Abe Cabinet and think that 
an amendment to the constitution is needed, the establishment of a constitutional court 
might not sound like a good idea. Those people may fear that this new court may fall into 
the political majority＇s control and may need another strategy to further Abe＇s security and 
defense statutes.
 One approach to Nagoya＇s high court decision74 might be available. In order for the 
Japanese government to send ground and maritime SDF forces to Iraq for rebuilding, the 
Diet enacted special statutes in ₂₀₀₃, which were valid for four years. The government 
extended them for an additional two years through ₂₀₀₉. The special laws75 regarding Iraqi 
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance were generalized in the ₂₀₁₅ Defense and 
Security Act with no expiration date.
 Nagoya＇s high court followed the CLB public interpretation of Article ₉ pertaining to 
the SDF and endorsed the existence of the right to live in peace as provided in the preamble 
of the Japanese Constitution. The court stated no infringe on the right to live in peace but it 
recognized the right with legal norms. The court found a difficult distinction between 
combat and non-combat regions. 
 The Nagoya high court endorses the right to live in peace and by denying a distinction 
between combat and non-combat regions, the court remanded the issue back to parliament 
for further deliberation. The Nagoya high court has the advantage that the judiciary 
maintains its authority and power of judicial review and encourages the legislature to review 
emphasize the National Police Reserve case. See also, Tsuji, supra note ₂₄ at ₇₉-₈₁.
72　Kunihiko Morohashi, Main Constitutional Amendments Drafts and Proposals, ₅₃₇ Research and 
Information (Issue Brief) ₁ (₂₀₀₆). Available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/issue/₀₅₃₇.
pdf (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
73　Constitutional draft submitted by the LDP. Available at https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/
pdf/seisaku-₁₀₉.pdf (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
 　See also,  GLENN HOOK & GAVEAN MACCORMACK, JAPAN＇ S CONTESTED 
CONSTITUTION ₃₄ (Routledge ₂₀₀₁).
 　Peace in Theory and Practice, supra note ₃ at ₈₂₀. 
74　Nagoya Koto Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.], April ₁₇, ₂₀₀₈. Heisei ₁₈ (ne) no. ₄₉₉. Tsuji, supra 
note ₂₄ at ₇₁-₇₃.
75　Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. Law 
No. ₃₇ of ₂₀₀₃ (Japan) [expired].
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statutes regarding Article ₉. 
III. Reconstruction of National Defense During the Abe Administration
1. Several patterns of attack
 In ₂₀₀₇, the first Abe Cabinet called a committee meeting for the reconstruction of 
national security (Anzen Hoshou no Houteki Kiban no Saikouchiku ni kansuru Kondankai). 
From September ₂₀₀₇ to December ₂₀₁₂, it was not convened under the Democratic Party 
ruling. The second Abe Administration came to power through an election in the House of 
Representatives in December ₂₀₁₂ and the committee resumed its discussion of collective 
defense power.
 The committee concluded several cases regarding joint defense activity, which at the 
time was only permissible under Article ₅ of the security treaty between Japan and the 
United States.76
 First, preemptive attacks were unacceptable even when one country was prepared to 
launch a missile targeting Japan. Only an exclusively defensive security policy (Senshu 
Bouei) was constitutional. The SDF was organized only for self-defense with no capability 
to attack foreign governments outside of Japanese territory. The SDF has the capacity to 
intercept missiles ﬂying into Japanese territory.
 Second, intercepting a missile that targets the U.S. over Japanese territory would be 
included in collective defense power,77 even if the missile does not target Japan. If it targets 
the U.S., the Aegis Combat System would be activated in the U.S.
 Third, intercepting a missile targeting Japan is permissible as a defensive action. It is, 
however, difﬁcult to intercept missiles. If the missile landed, then the defense and security 
treaty between Japan and the U.S. would be triggered.
 Fourth, attacking U.S. forces stationed in Japan activates the treaty between the U.S. 
and Japan. Pre-₂₀₁₄, the Japanese government explained that to defense for Japanese people 
near the U.S forces base is included in its individual defensive power and the U.S. 
76　Nihonkoku to Amerika Gasshukoku to no aidano anzen hoshou jouyaku [Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States], Japan-U.S., January ₁₉, ₁₉₆₀, 
Treaty No. ₆.
77　SAKATA, supra note ₂₃ at ₇₀.
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government stated that activating the treaty based on an attack on its forces is part of the 
collective defense power.
 Fifth, if a fighter aircraft flies into Japanese airspace, Japanese SDF air forces will 
scramble for take off. Typically, fighter aircraft fly in an air defense identification zone 
(ADIZ), in which case, the SDF will scramble for take off. 
 Sixth, supporting U.S. marine ships was included in the collective defense power. 
Three conditions must be met to exercise self-defense power: an immediate and imminent 
threat must occur; no alternative measure must exist; and the required minimum ability to 
use its self-defense power must exist. In order to protect the Japanese territory, the pre-₂₀₁₄ 
interpretation found that the SDF may assist U.S. marine ships as an individual defense 
power.78
 Seventh, detecting and disposing of underwater mines placed by other countries was 
included in collective defense power. If underwater mines targeted Japan, the SDF could 
exercise individual defense power, which was an impractical theory because underwater 
mines are usually placed for any ship that navigates the country＇s water.
 Eighth, if a Japanese citizen is under attack in foreign territory, Japan is prohibited 
from sending the SDF outside Japanese territory.
 In May ₂₀₁₄, this private committee submitted several proposals to the Abe 
Administration advising that amendments to the existing defense statutes were needed to 
clarify the scope of collective power.79
 In February ₂₀₁₆, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained, ＂[t]he security 
environment around Japan has become increasingly severe as represented by nuclear and 
missile development in North Korea. Transnational threats grounded on technological 
progress including international terrorism and cyber attacks are also increasing.＂80
 New phases of war, including cyber war and counter terrorism by police, were not 
much discussed in detail during the meetings of this private committee. Those against the 
78　Id at ₆₂.
79　See also, Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Amendment, ₃₇ Nanzan Review of American Studies ₅₁ 
(₂₀₁₅) [hereinafter Constitutional Amendment]. 
80　Japan＇s Security/Peace and Stability of the International Community. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
February ₁₀, ₂₀₁₆. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/ (last visited on February ₁₈, 
₂₀₁₆).
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₂₀₁₄ Abe Cabinet decision believe that these new phases would not fall solely under 
individual defense power.
2. The Constitution and the LDP in Japan
 The LDP was formed in ₁₉₅₅, three years after Japan signed the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty.81 The LDP was the ruling party and the largest opposition party was the Japanese 
Socialist Party. The LDP＇s goal was to establish its own constitution for the Japanese people 
and Abe attempted to achieve that goal. 
 Prof. Yoichi Higuchi explained the unique Japanese political phenomena of the LDP. 
The Japanese prime minister purposely didn＇t put constitutional reforms on the political 
agenda, even though he supported amending the constitution. Japanese people were both for 
and against constitutional amendments within LDP factions.82 Japanese constitutional law 
scholars should research intra-factional conflicts and questions whether changing party 
leaders reﬂects the will of voters.
 After the ₁₉₉₃ collapse of the ＂₁₉₅₅ system＂ (₅₅  Nen Taisei), Japanese people saw not 
only constitutional amendments but intra-factional competition within the LDP. There have 
been no major party changes; thus, Japanese people have only experienced the political 
games between the right and left wings of the LDP. It is not clear whether this unique 
political situation would inﬂuence a certain Japanese constitutional administrative power or 
interpretation of Article ₉. Arikawa and Hasebe point out that the ₂₀₁₄ cabinet decision was 
made in haste and impaired the rule of law and Japan＇s legal stability as a sovereign nation.83 
IV. Pre-article 9 Japan 
 Although one of the private drafts by Japanese constitutional scholars recommended 
establishing a presidential system, the Japanese Constitution adopted the parliamentary 
system. The cabinet is subject to the conﬁdence of the Diet.84 The prime minister is one of 
81　Nippon Koku to no Heiwa Jouyaku [Treaty of Peace with Japan], April ₂₈, ₁₉₅₂, Treaty No. ₅.
82　YOUICHI HIGUCHI, KENPO KAISEI DOU KANGAERUKA [How to Consider Amendments to 
the Constitution Today] ₅₇, ₅₉ (Iwanamishoten ₂₀₁₃).
83　For more information on their arguments, see Constitutional Amendment, supra note ₇₉ at ₅₈-.
84　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₆₉. If the House of Representatives passes a non-
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the members of the Diet and the House of Representatives may pass a non-confidence 
resolution or reject a conﬁdence resolution to force the cabinet to resign through the use of 
Article ₆₉ of the Japanese Constitution. 
 Before analyzing Article ₉, a few other constitutional issues will be discussed. 
1. Controlling executive power with the constitution
 The prime minister acts as the supreme commander of the SDF. Executive power 
belongs to the cabinet through Article ₆₅85 of the Japanese Constitution. The Meiji 
Constitution was similar to the Prussian Constitution in that the Emperor86 had strong power 
and the Imperial Diet87 was merely a supporter of the Emperor. 
 The current Japanese Constitution follows the English cabinet and parliamentary 
system. The highest-ranking person in the cabinet is the prime minister, who has the 
authority to appoint and remove ministers.88 
 The cabinet＇s mission is to implement statutes, draft general and basic policies, and 
direct and supervise the administrative branches. The cabinet is divided into three roles as 
explained by constitutional scholars in Japan.89
 The highest level is the administration, which makes, directs, and supervises policy via 
Article ₆₅.90 The second level derives from management, which maintains and develops the 
organization to efficiently implement administrative purposes. The third level is the 
implementation of statutes and regulations on the front line, led by inferior ofﬁcials. This 
understanding is one of several interpretations of Articles ₆₅ and ₇₂91 of the Japanese 
Constitution.
conﬁdence resolution, or rejects a conﬁdence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the 
House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (₁₀) days.
85　See id. Art. ₆₅. Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.
86　Dainihon Teikoku Kenpo [Kenpo] [Meiji Constitution, Constitution of the Empire of Japan], Art. 
₁.
87　See id. Arts. ₅ and ₇.
 　Yoichi Higuchi, The Constitution and the Emperor System, JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
supra note ₄₂ at ₅₈-.
88　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Arts. ₆₆-₆₈.
89　MASANARI SAKAMOTO, KENPO ₁  CLASSIKUSU [CONSTITUTION I CLASSIC] ₁₉₅ 
(Yuchindo ₂₀₀₀). 
90　Id. See also, SHIGENORI MATSUI, KENPO [Constitution of Japan] ₂₁₃-₂₁₇ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₀₇).
91　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₇₂.
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 Generally, Japanese constitutional studies92 focus on cabinet leadership, because the 
Meiji government lost control93 as a result of military interference during events such as the 
₂₂₆ coup d＇État (the February ₂₆ incident) in ₁₉₃₆. The prime minister was simply one of 
many ministers and had no power to remove the ministers who were against the cabinet 
under the Meiji Constitution;94 thus, they needed to resign as a whole, and it is worth noting 
that the military was against the cabinet.
 Details regarding cabinet meetings are not stipulated in the Japanese Constitution.95 
Decision-making in the cabinet is autonomous and is beyond judicial review but is 
accountable to the legislature.96 The cabinet and legislature work together to shape mid- and 
long-term goals regarding basic and general policies. The NSC must provide free access to 
information to the general public.
 In the activities set forth in the ₂₀₁₅ National Defense Acts, the extent of control 
through legislation is different. These statutes stipulate pre- or post-approval of the Diet.
 The control of executive power by the legislature is stipulated in the Japanese 
Constitution.97 Article ₆₁ of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that the Diet must approve 
a treaty that is concluded by the cabinet.98 The legislature approves treaties with other 
nations that are concluded by the cabinet. This procedure is clearly written in Article ₇₃(₃) 
of the Japanese Constitution.99 Any treaty executed without the consent of the Diet will have 
no effect. The Japanese Constitution cannot be altered by a treaty because the power to 
92　KOJI SATO, supra note ₁₂  at ₄₈₀ . 
 　TOSHIHIKO NONAKA, MUTSUO NAKAMURA, KAZUYUKI TAKAHASHI, and 
KATSUTOSHI TAKAMI, KENPO II [Constitution II] ₁₆₆ (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₂) [hereinafter NONAKA 
ET. AL VOL. II ].
93　Dainihon Teikoku Kenpo [Meiji Constitution, Constitution of the Empire of Japan], Arts. ₁₁ and 
₅₅.
94　See id. Art. ₅₅.
95　Naikaku Hou [The Cabinet Act], Law No. ₃₃ of ₂₀₁₅, Arts. ₄ and ₆.
96　See id. Art. ₁. Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₆₉.
97　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₆₀(₂). Upon consideration of the budget, when the 
House of Councilors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when 
no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or 
in the case of failure by the House of Councilors to take final action within thirty (₃₀) days, the 
period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the 
decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.
98　See id. Art. ₆₁. The second paragraph of the preceding article applies to the approval of the Diet as 
required for the conclusion of treaties.
99　See id. Art. ₇₃(₃).
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conclude and approve treaties is granted by the constitution.100 Detailed executive 
agreements under a treaty do not require the legislature＇s approval. Important, complicated 
matters might be included in the executive agreement and not in the treaty. 
 As in other parliamentary systems, the legislative and executive powers are required to 
work together. Their deliberations are typically in favor of the majority, but they must reﬂect 
the opinions of the minorities who are unable to convey their positions to the democratic 
branches. There was poor decision-making during the ₂₀₁₅ defense and security bill 
deliberations and those who were against the Abe government argued that the doctrine was 
passed in order to avoid judicial review in the name of autonomy in the House of the Diet.101
 The judiciary is a passive branch. It avoids unnecessary political disputes and cannot 
review its autonomy from the political branches such as through cabinet meetings or 
committee deliberations.102 However, there may be space for the judiciary to review issues 
such as those involving the infringement of human rights.103
2. Special tribunals independent of the judiciary
 Under the ₂₀₁₂ LDP constitutional draft, a military court was established in the 
National Defense Force. Article ₆₀ of the Meiji Constitution104 accepted the military court, 
which was independent of the regular judiciary. A soldier may commit certain actions that 
are prohibited in the general criminal code. Thus, it is necessary to keep military order and 
determine legality in a special tribunal independent of the regular judiciary.
 According to the current Japanese Constitution, the judiciary has special courts that 
have jurisdiction over certain cases in the hierarchy of the judiciary.105 There are special 
tribunals with jurisdiction over certain cases with the possibility of an appeal to a higher 
court in venues such as the Tokyo Intellectual Property Court or in family courts. Without 
amending Article ₇₆(₂)106 of the Japanese Constitution, it is easy to imagine the existence of 
100　See id. Art. ₉₈.
101　Tsuji, supra note ₂₄ at ₆₈-. 
102　Id. 
103　KOJI SATO, supra note ₁₂  at ₄₆₄ . 
104　Dainihon Teikoku Kenpo [Meiji Constitution, Constitution of the Empire of Japan], Art. ₆₀.
105　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₇₆(₂). No extraordinary tribunal shall be 
established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given ﬁnal judicial power.
106　Yuichiro Tsuji, Why Does the Japanese Constitution Not Include the Creation of a Special 
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special courts if an appeal to general court is available. In the ₂₂₆  coup d＇État (February ₂₆ 
incident) of ₁₉₃₆, military ofﬁcers advocated for a revolution and led inferior soldiers in an 
attack on the government. They assassinated the prime minister and several other ministers. 
The government ordered this insurgent troop to return to the original force in two days. The 
ofﬁcers were sentenced to death without a fair trial in a special military tribunal not open to 
public, which was established by an edict of the Emperor and not by statute.
3. The 2015 national defense and security statutes 
 In ₂₀₁₄, the Abe Administration created three new conditions to make defense power 
permissible under Article ₉. First, an attack on Japan must occur, a nation in a close 
relationship with Japan must be attacked, the existence of the Japanese nation must be 
endangered, or it must be clear that life, liberty, and the right to the pursuit of happiness is 
threatened. Second, there must be no alternative measures to prevent the attack, preserve the 
nation, and protect the people. Third, its exercise must meet the necessary minimum 
requirements. 
 The Diet amended the Self-Defense Force Act.107 Previously, Article ₃ of the SDF Act 
limited SDF defense activity against direct or indirect invasion. This meant that the SDF 
could exercise only defensive security activities known as Senshu Bouei. The phrase ＂direct 
or indirect＂ was subsequently deleted. Previously, Article ₇₆ of the SDF Act provided for 
defense activities. A new condition in Paragraph ₂ of Article ₇₆108 was added: ＂a nation in a 
close relationship with Japan is attacked, the existence of the Japanese nation is endangered, 
or it is clear that life, liberty, and the right to the pursuit of happiness is threatened.＂ Article 
₇₆ authorized the sending the force to maintain security and peace. Article ₈₈109 provides for 
the use of force for defense.
 Buryoku Kogeki Jitai Hou110 or the Act Concerning Measures for the Protection of the 
People in Armed Attack Situations, Etc. was passed in the Diet. This act provides for three 
Tribunal?, ₂₃(₁) Surugadai Journal of Law and Politics ₁₇₀ (₂₀₀₉).
107　Jiei Tai Hou [The Self-Defense Force Act], Act No. ₇₆ as of ₂₀₁₅, Art. ₃.
108　See id. Art. ₇₆.
109　See id. Art. ₈₈.
110　Buryoku Kougeki Jitai tou ni okeru Wagakuni no Heiwa to Dokuritsu narabini Kuni oyobi 
Kokumin no Anezenn no Kakuho ni Kansuru Houritsu (Buyroku Kogeki Jitai hou) [Act Concerning 
Measures for the Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, Etc.], Act No. ₇₆ as of ₂₀₁₅.
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types of situations that could occur when Japan is under attack. The ﬁrst situation is when 
an armed attack happens or there is clear and imminent danger of armed attack. The second 
is a predictable armed attack that does not reach the level of an armed attack but an armed 
attack is imminent. The third is an armed attack that includes the first and second 
situations.111 The purpose of this act is to ensure peace and independence for Japan and the 
Japanese people and to set forth the responsibilities and procedures for central and local 
governments.112 
 The deﬁnition for Buryoku Kogeki Jitai should not be overbroad. The current deﬁnition 
is too difﬁcult to understand. This Act added the new notion of Sonritsu Kiki Jitai. New 
wording for Sonritsu Kiki Jitai was created but it is difﬁcult to translate into English and an 
ofﬁcial translation was not available as of February ₂₀₁₆. It likely means an armed attack 
against a foreign country resulting in a threat to Japan＇s survival. This language was added 
to Article ₇₆ of the Self-Defense Force Act as well.113
 The opposing political party criticized this complicated definition. The Abe Cabinet 
explained that the government reviewed the will of potential attacking nations, their 
capacity, their geographical locations, and their probability to cause war. In June, ₂₀₁₅, the 
Abe cabinet responded to the criticism that some the attack on the U.S. led to problems in 
Japan.114
 The goals of the Abe Cabinet are to permit the SDF to dispose of underwater mines in 
the Strait of Hormuz,115 to intercept missiles targeting the U.S., and to search and inspect 
suspected ships. The revised Article ₇₆ of the Self-Defense Force Act did not provide 
conditions for taking these speciﬁc actions.116
111　See id. Art. ₂.
112　See id. Art. ₁.
113　Jiei Tai Hou [The Self-Defense Force Act], Act No. ₇₆ as of ₂₀₁₅, Art. ₇₆.
114　Shudan teki Jieiken Meihaku na Kiki de kousi kanou [Collective defense power is exercised by 
clear danger against the U.S. ship]. The Mainichi Shimbun, (July ₁₁, ₂₀₁₅).
 　For a summary of the opinion of the Ministry of Defense (August ₂₅, ₂₀₁₅), see http://www.mod.
go.jp/j/press/kisha/₂₀₁₅/₀₈/₂₅.html (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
115　NARAHIKO TOYOSHITA and SHOICHI KOSEKI, SHUDANTEKI JIEIKEN TO ANZEN 
HOSHUO [Collective Defense Power and Security] iv, v, and ₂₆ (Iwanamishinsho ₂₀₁₄). Prof. 
Toyoshita feels that the limitations explained by Abe are nonsense because there is no public sea at 
that location and the Japanese SDF must accept the nation＇s (Iran or Iraq) consent to enter.
116　Jiei Tai Hou [The Self-Defense Force Act], Act No. ₇₆ as of ₂₀₁₅, Art. ₇₆.
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 The Abe Cabinet＇s justiﬁcation for the use of force may include the prevention of an 
economic crisis such as an insufficient supply of everyday commodities and electricity, 
which are vital to the survival of the Japanese people. It is not clear how the government 
will address general economic crises. As the Abe Cabinet notes, the Strait of Hormuz is very 
important for Japan in that the country imports approximately eighty percent of its oil from 
suppliers who move through that area. The opposing party responded that closing the strait 
would create an economic crisis, not Sonritsu Kiki Jitai, which was added to the Buryoku 
Kogeki Jitai Hou.
 According to the government＇s explanation, this notion may entail the ﬁrst requirement 
of the three new conditions to make defense permissible under Article ₉. An attack on Japan 
must occur, a nation in a close relationship with Japan must be attacked, the existence of the 
Japanese nation must be endangered, or it must be clear that life, liberty, and the right to the 
pursuit of happiness is threatened. 
 Sonritsu Kiki Jitai is a case wherein collective defense forces operate when a nation 
that is close to Japan is attacked.117
 Shuhen Jitai Hou118 or the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan 
in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was revised to Juyo Eikyo Jitai Hou119 or 
the Important Inﬂuencing Situations Act. The Japanese government has not yet provided an 
ofﬁcial English version of this act. 
 The government is responsible for clarifying this notion. It may be broader than 
Sonritsu Kiki Jitai on three points. First, the definition of Sonritsu Kiki Jitai includes a 
situation wherein Japanese peace and safety are in danger and it does not require an attack 
against Japan. Juyo Eikyo Jitai includes Sonritsu Kiki Jitai. Second, Sonritsu Kiki Jitai does 
117　The Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the phrase ＂Ittaika with use of force.＂ There might be 
criticism as whether this is an appropriate notion under international law. ＂This is intended to keep 
Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out the ＇use of force＇ on its own, which is not 
permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an ＇integral part＇ of the use 
of force (＂ittaika with the use of force＂) by other countries.＂ Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/
nsp/page₂₃e_₀₀₀₂₇₃.html (last visited on February ₁₈, ₂₀₁₆).
118　Shuhen Jitai ni saishite Wagakuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen wo Kakuho surutameno Sochi ni 
kansuru Houritsu (Shuhen Jitai Hou) [Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in 
Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan], Act No. ₆₀ of ₁₉₉₉.
119　Juyo Eikyo Jitai ni saishite Wagakuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen wo Kakuho surutameno Sochi ni 
kansuru Houritsu (Juyo Eikyo Jitai Hou) [Important Inﬂuencing Situations Act], Act No. ₇₆ of ₂₀₁₅.
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not contain the geographic limitations found in Shuhen Jitai such as the perilous situation 
surrounding Japan provision in the previous act, which predicted disputes on the Korean 
Peninsula; sending the SDF to the Middle East and Indian Ocean was not permitted due to 
geographic limitations. This new act enables the government to send the SDF to the Strait of 
Hormuz and the South China Sea with no geographic limitations. Third, the SDF can 
exercise the use of force in Sonritsu Kiki Jitai, not in Juyo Eikyo Jitai. Juyo Eikyo Jitai Hou, 
which was revised to Shuhen Jitai Hou and enables the government to send in the SDF for 
logistical support. In order to address Juyo Eikyo Jitai, the SDF may work with U.S. forces 
or foreign forces contributing to U.N. purposes or those of other, similar organizations. The 
SDF may carry fuel, conduct aerial refueling, transport goods to the U.S. Army, clean up 
interferences in the South China Sea, and maintain sea lanes.
 The opposition party complained that logistical support raises the risk of war in which 
the Japanese SDF may be involved. A detailed explanation was available on the website of 
Masahisa Sato, a member of the LDP and the House of Councilors.120 Sato explains that if 
closing the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East constitutes Sonritsu Kiki Jitai, it does not 
overlap with Juyo Eikyo Jitai, although he posted his own interpretation on his website. He 
was temporary commissioner for peace and defense statutes in ₂₀₁₅. It might show 
difﬁculty to understand these deﬁnitions.
 The government raised the complicated notion of Buryoku Kosi no Ittaika, an activity 
integrated with the use of force. When Japan is not attacked directly, Article ₉ prohibits the 
SDF from taking actions that are integrated with the use of the force. There are several 
requirements: the SDF cannot work in places where combat is occurring, the foreign 
government must consent to Japanese SDF work, and the SDF must stop performing in 
cases where activities cannot be performed safely. The SDF can provide logistical support 
until combat begins. The SDF may search, rescue, and inspect ships under the Inspection 
Activity of Ships Act.121 Other necessary measures may be taken to address the issue of Juyo 
120　Masahisa Sato, Juyo Eikyo Jitai, Sonritsu Kiki Jitai, Buryoku Eikyou Jitai no Kankei 
[Relationship and distinction among Juyo Eikyo Jitai and Sonritsu Kiki Jitai and Buryoku Eikyou 
Jitai]. 
 　Available at http://ameblo.jp/satomasahisa/entry-₁₂₀₃₅₇₄₄₈₄₈.html (last visited on February ₁₈, 
₂₀₁₆).
121　Juyo Eikyo Jitai ni saishite Jissisuru Senpaku Kensa Katsudo ni kansuru Houritsu [Inspection 
Activity of Ships Act], Act No. ₇₆ of ₂₀₁₅.
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Eikyo Jitai.
 The director of the SDF may temporarily suspend its mission when combat occurs in 
the region or nearby or when combat is expected to occur. The Ministry of Defense 
designates the region of SDF activity and suspends its mission or changes the designated 
region when all or part of a locations makes it difﬁcult to perform its mission.
 Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Hou122 or the Act on Cooperation with United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, was promulgated in ₂₀₁₅. In Japan, it is 
called the new PKO (Peacekeeping Operations) Act. The SDF can work on International 
Peace Cooperation Assignments123 and peacekeeping operations. The SDF may perform 
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities and peacekeeping activities not under 
the direction of the U.N.
 Five principles have been set forth to ensure that participation in peacekeeping 
operations is in accordance with Article ₉ of the Constitution: 
(₁) Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts. (₂) 
Consent for the undertaking of UN Peacekeeping Operations and Japan＇s participation in such 
operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conﬂicts. 
(₃) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed 
conﬂicts. (₄) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned principles cease to be satisﬁed, 
the Government of Japan may withdraw the Self-Defense Force (SDF) contingent. (₅) The use of 
weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.124
 There are other conditions that the government must satisfy prior to sending the SDF 
122　Kokusai Rengo Heiwa Iji Katsudou tou ni taisuru Kyouryokuni kansuru Houritsu (Kokusai 
Heiwa Kyoryoku Hou) [Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations], Act No. ₇₆ of ₂₀₁₅.
123　The ＂International Peace Cooperation Assignments＂ that Japan conducts refer to the following 
tasks implemented for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, tasks provided below in (₁₀) to (₁₇) 
for International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and in (₇) and (₁₇) for International Election 
Observation Operations (Article ₃, item ₃).
 　(₇) Observation or management of the fair execution of elections for a representative assembly, 
referendums or any other similar elections or voting.
 　(₁₇) Other tasks similar to those listed in (₁) to (₁₆) above as speciﬁed by Cabinet Order.
124　The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan＇s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), 
Outline of Japan＇s International Peace Cooperation. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/
page₂₂e_₀₀₀₆₈₃.html (last visited on ₂₆ in February, ₂₀₁₆).
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overseas. The ﬁrst condition is upon a resolution of a general meeting of the U.N., the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council, or the U.N. Security Council. 
 Second, the SDF may be dispatched upon request from the U.N., an organization or 
special department established by a general meeting of the U.N., the Ofﬁce of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, or other groups established by ministerial order. Regional 
experience with a special organization is necessary for this activity under Article ₅₂ of the 
U.N. Charter or with an organization established by multiple governmental treaties as 
provided by the European Union or other ordinance. 
 Third, the SDF may be dispatched upon request from the government where PKO 
activities are being performed only if it is supported by a principal organization as set forth 
in Article ₇ of the U.N. Charter. 
 The distinction between combat and non-combat regions has been maintained. The 
Japanese government may send the SDF to non-combat regions only. SDF activity 
integrated into the use of force is prohibited.
 This new act expands the scope of SDF missions. Not only is ceaseﬁre monitoring and 
supporting victims permitted but rushing to the rescue Japanese people outside Japanese 
territory (Kaketsuke Keigo) was also added. 
 The condition to use weapons was also revised. In the case of the SDF aiding Japanese 
people outside of its territory, weapon use is permitted only when performing Kaketsuke 
Keigo rescue missions. A safe program exists for the temporary suspension of a mission to 
aid any SDF member in danger.
 Ceaseﬁre monitoring and ensuring safety require prior Diet approval. Only when the 
House of Representatives is closed or dissolved, post approval is possible.
4. Approval of the Diet 
 The most important changes were that the exclusively defensive security policy known 
as Senshu Bouei and the geographic limits were dissolved. SDF activity is controlled by 
parliament. The degree of control varies according to defense and peace statutes enacted in 
₂₀₁₅.
 First, the strongest level of control is pre-approval of the Diet in any case. This was 
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outlined in the Kokusai Heiwa Sien Hou125 or the International Peace Supporting Act.
 There is no exception for pre-approval.126 The cabinet is obligated to report to the Diet 
for a basic plan and policy.127 The Houses of the Diet must approve that plan and policy 
within seven (₇) days. Post-approval is permitted only if the Houses of the Diet is closed or 
the House of the Representatives is dissolved. The cabinet must report to the Diet on any 
change to the basic plan.128
 Prior to this act, the Diet enacted legislation containing a speciﬁed duration for when 
the government sent the SDF overseas. In October ₂₀₀₁, after the ₉/₁₁ terrorist attacks, the 
Japanese government passed the Counter Terrorism at Sea Act; it speciﬁed a duration of two 
(₂) years.129 Under Kokusai Heiwa Sien Hou, the SDF would monitor ceaseﬁres and support 
disaster victims. After two years, additional approval of the Diet was required.130
 The Buryoku Kogeki Jitai Hou or the Act Concerning Measures for the Protection of 
the People in Armed Attack Situations, Etc. requires prior approval of the Diet soon after a 
cabinet decision is made.131 
 Juyo Eikyo Jitai Hou revised Shuhen Jitai Hou, requiring prior approval of the Diet. In 
an emergency, post-approval is required.132 Logistical support by the SDF and search and 
rescue activities must be approved by the Diet.133 The cabinet shall report to the Diet of any 
125　Kokusai Heiwa Kyodo Taisho Jitai ni saishite Wagakuni ga Jissisuru Shogaikokuno Guntai tou ni 
taisuru Kyoryoku Sien Katsudo tou ni kansuru Houritsu (Kokusai Heiwa Sien Hou) [International 
Peace Supporting Act], Act No. ₇₇ of ₂₀₁₅.
126　See id. Arts. ₅ and ₆. 
127　See id. Art. ₄.
128　See id. Art. ₅(₁).
129　Tero Taisaku Kaijou Oshi Katsudo ni taisuru Hokyu Sien Katsudo no Jisshi ni Kansuru Tokubetsu 
Sochi Hou, (Counter Terrorism at Sea Act) [Act on Special Measures for Implementation Supply and 
Support for Activities Regarding Counter Terrorism at Sea], No. ₁₁₃ of ₂₀₀₁.
130　Kokusai Heiwa Kyodo Taisho Jitai ni saishite Wagakuni ga Jissisuru Shogaikokuno Guntai tou ni 
taisuru Kyoryoku Sien Katsudo tou ni kansuru Houritsu (Kokusai Heiwa Sien Hou) [International 
Peace Supporting Act], Act No. ₇₇ of ₂₀₁₅, Art. ₆(₃).
131　Buryoku Kougeki Jitai tou ni okeru Wagakuni no Heiwa to Dokuritsu narabini Kuni oyobi 
Kokumin no Anezenn no Kakuho ni Kansuru Houritsu (Buyroku Kogeki Jitai hou) [Act Concerning 
Measures for the Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, Etc.], Act No. ₇₆ as of ₂₀₁₅, 
Art. ₉(₄)(₇)(₁₀)(₁₄).
132　Juyo Eikyo Jitai ni saishite Wagakuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen wo Kakuho surutameno Sochi ni 
kansuru Houritsu (Juyo Eikyo Jitai Hou) [Important Inﬂuencing Situations Act], Act No. ₇₆ of ₂₀₁₅, 
Art. ₅.
133　See id. Art. ₆.
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changes and responses to the basic plan.
 The Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Hou or the Act on Cooperation with the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations requires prior approval of the Diet in order 
for the SDF to support another country＇s army in ceaseﬁre monitoring and ensuring safety. 
Post-approval is available only when the Diet is closed or the House of Representatives is 
dissolved.134 
 Humanitarian rebuilding support does not need approval from the Diet. Determinations, 
changes in implementation, and duration change must be reported to the Diet. The original 
dispatching requirements are in force for two years and after the two-year period, re-
approval by the Diet is necessary. The Diet makes every effort to approve a request within 
seven (₇) days.
 These statutes illustrate how a representative legislature controls the cabinet and the 
supreme commander of the SDF as well as the prime minister through the Japanese 
Constitution.
V. Article 9 and Legal Stability 
1. Responsibilities of the CLB
 Hasebe135 points out that in ₂₀₁₄, Abe＇s Cabinet changed its interpretation of Article ₉ 
pertaining to legal instability. Inﬂuenced by Joseph Raz and other scholars in the U.S.,136 the 
₂₀₁₄ cabinet decision dramatically changed these once ﬁxed principles and rules. Hasebe 
might be true because since the promulgation of the current constitution, Japanese cabinets 
generally are in power only a few years.137 The prime minister is also the leader of the ruling 
134　Kokusai Rengo Heiwa Iji Katsudou tou ni taisuru Kyouryokuni kansuru Houritsu (Kokusai 
Heiwa Kyoryoku Hou) [Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other 
Operations], Act No. ₇₆ of ₂₀₁₅, Art. ₆(₇)-(₁₂).
135　YASUO HASEBE, Shudanteki Jieiken Kousi Younin ron no mondaiten [The Problems of 
Endorsing Collective Defense Power], ₈ Jiyu to Seigi [Liberty and Justice] ₆₅ (₂₀₁₄). YASUO 
HASEBE, KENSHO ANPO HOUAN [Review of the Security and Defense Bill] (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₅).
136　YASUO HASEBE, HIKAKU FUNO NA KACHI NO MEIRO [Maze of Incommensurable Values, 
Constitutional Theory for Liberal Democracy] ₁₅₂, ₁₆₂, ₁₆₅-(Tokyo University Press ₂₀₀₀). 
YASUO HASEBE, ANPO HOUSEI KARA KANGAERU RIKKENSHUGI MINSHUSHUGI [PEACE 
AND DEFENSE LAW FROM CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY] (Yuhikaku ₂₀₁₆).
137　Shigeru Yoshida: ₂₆₁₆ days, Eisaku Sato: ₂₇₉₈ days, and Junishiro Koizumi: ₁₉₈₀ days.
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party under the parliamentary system. Intra-fractional political disputes have inﬂuence on 
the cabinet. The term of leaders in the political party is typically two or three years,138 as set 
forth by the party code. Thus, the position of the prime minister is subject to these intra-
fractional disputes.
 Hasebe expressed a fear that important rules may face mid- and long-term changes due 
to short terms for prime ministers, causing people to distrust the rule of law and the 
management of the government. Hasebe believes in the CLB as the French Conseil d＇État. 
 Hasebe＇s argument may be evidenced by the CLB＇s accountability after ₂₀₁₅. The CLB 
changed its public interpretation twice.139 One interpretation was Article ₆₆(₂), the civilian 
clause. The other was Article ₉. The CLB is controlled by the cabinet and the Diet and the 
explanations by ministers using the CLB＇s public interpretation of Article ₉ have been 
inconsistent.140 
 Human dignity is a universal principle and people＇s viewpoints vary on how to 
maintain peace. The constitution works to create tools to keep universal values such as the 
dignity of humanity and the maintenance of stability among competing interests by using 
the rule of law. 
 Shigenori Matsui argues that ＂the existence of the SDF, despite the relatively clear 
provision prohibiting armed forces even for the purpose of self-defense, may underminethe 
rule of law and the basic assumption of constitutionalism＂.141
 Shojiro Sakaguchi142 points out that the constitution works as a pre-commitment that 
binds the judgment of the future generation. As Hasebe and Sakaguchi argue, rule of law 
under the constitution must maintain mid- and long-term stability.
 Stability is ultimately based on the people＇s decisions and plays into sovereignty. The 
people carve out their destiny, take responsibility, and accept their decisions.143 Democracy 
138　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₄₅. The term of ofﬁce for Members of the House 
of Representatives shall be four years. However, the term shall be terminated before the full term is up 
where the House of Representatives is dissolved. 
139　SAKATA, supra note ₂₃ at ₁₆₂.
140　ASANO ET.AL, KENPO TOBENSHU [Answers from the Constitution] (Shinzansha ₂₀₀₃).
141　SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN ₂₅₅ (Hart publishing ₂₀₁₁).
142　SHOUJIRO SAKAGUCHI, RIKKENSHUGI TO MINSHUSHUGI [Constitutionalism and 
Democracy] (Nihon Hyoronsha ₂₀₀₁). 
143　Constitutional Amendment, supra note ₇₉ at ₆₇-.
 　Tsuji, supra note ₂₄ at ₈₆-. 
68
筑波法政第₆₈号（₂₀₁₆）
uses various tools that supplement imperfect systems in Japan. The terms pertaining to 
defense and security are too complicated for the general public. One of the missions of 
constitutional law scholars in Japan is to bridge the gap between constitutional law texts and 
people＇s understanding. This supports the rule of law in Japan to maintain the universal 
values of the constitution.
2. Ohishi and Fujita arguments
 In ₂₀₀₇, Prof. Makoto Ohishi, an advocate for the Abe Administration＇s interpretation 
of Article ₉, analyzed the interpretation for the CLB.144 The mission of the CLB is to pursue 
logical consistency in the interpretation of statutes and the constitution. The CLB must be 
prudent in changing its interpretation and giving advice to the cabinet. 
 The content of collective defense power has not been clear under international law but 
is admitted through customary international law. Ohishi argues that an ofﬁcial explanation 
from the CLB has not effectively explained collective defense power. By citing statements 
made by members of the Diet, he argues that the CLB endorsed the existence of a collective 
defense power but denied the exercise thereof. He states that the CLB should show 
persuasive grounds for collective defense power. The silent interpretative approach may 
need answers from constitutional law scholars. Ohishi concludes that the Japanese 
Constitution does not prohibit collective defense power. He focused on the function of the 
CLB, which is to secure legal stability and predictability. He argues that a constitutional 
amendment is the best way to approve collective defense power. 
 Ex-Justice Tokiyasu Fujita states145 that the ₂₀₁₄ cabinet decision was an irrational 
political action and constitutional law scholars expressed strong criticism against the Abe 
Cabinet. He regrets that a majority of public law professors have not made consistent 
sophisticated analyses. Fujita analyzes that the pre-₂₀₁₄ official interpretation permitted 
only individual defense power not collective defense power. He put forth three principles in 
support of this approach.
144　Makoto Ohishi, Nihonkoku Kenpo to Shudan teki jieiken [The Japanese Constitution and 
Collective Defense Power] ₁₃₄₃ Jurist ₃₇ (₂₀₀₇).
145　Tokiyasu Fujita, Oboegaki Shudan teki Jieiken no kousi Younin wo meguru Iken Ron [Note, 
Unconstitutional Opinion regarding Endorsement of Collective Defense Power] ₉₂(₂) Jichi Kenkyu 
₃ (₂₀₁₆). 
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 First, the interpretation of the constitution is important. If it the interpretation is wrong, 
we must correct it. We cannot prohibit modiﬁcations. The Supreme Court may vacate the 
decision and change the interpretation. Fujita thinks that valid reasoning is required if we 
need to change the interpretation of Article ₉. Taking objection to Abe cabinet by his 
interpretation is against ＂Constitutionalism＂ is not strong enough and additional justiﬁcation 
is needed why ＂legal stability＂ binds governmental interpretation so strictly. He suspects that 
an Article ₉ interpretation will transform into a legal norm in the end. 
 Second, the CLB is an organization that assists the cabinet in interpretations. The CLB 
does not make the cabinet＇s interpretation binding. Fujita understood that Prime Minister 
Abe＇s statement ＂I am the ﬁnal interpreter of the Constitution under the cabinet,＂ has only 
temporary effect.
 Third, the ﬁnal interpreter of the constitution is the Supreme Court, not the CLB.
 Fujita believes that constitutional law scholars should debut Abe cabinet interpretation 
of Article ₉ in endorsing collective defense power if they want.
3. The Inoue and Hasebe arguments
 Tatsuo Inoue, a legal philosophy specialist, argues that individual defense power and 
collective security under the U.N. are the best solutions for defense and security in Japan 
today.146 He focuses on the history of GHQ interventions and the drafting of the Japanese 
Constitution. The U.S. has rule of law under its constitution and Japan can use the 
constitution to establish an equal relationship for peace and defense.
 According to Inoue, an exclusively defensive security policy, known as Senshu Bouei, 
can be the subject of a constitutional amendment without using amendment procedures 
(Kaishaku Kaiken). The SDF and the treaty between Japan and the U.S. for defense and 
security purposes is unconstitutional.
 Since the Japanese Constitution was promulgated, facts have accumulated. The ₂₀₁₄ 
cabinet decision expanded the SDF＇s activities. Inoue is against the ₂₀₁₄ decision and insists 
that Article ₉ should be deleted unless the Japanese Constitution is amended under formal 
146　TATSUO INOUE, RIBERARU NO KOTO HA KIRAI DEMO RIBERARIZUM HA KIRAI NI 
NARANAI DE KUDASAI [Even Though You Don＇t Like Liberals, Please Don＇t Like Liberalism] ₄₀-
₇₀ (Mainichi Shinbum Shuppan ₂₀₁₅).
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procedures as set forth in Article ₉₆.147 By changing the public interpretation of the 
constitution without using formal amendment procedures (Kaishaku Kaiken), the core of 
constitutionalism is circumvented. Abe should have followed formal procedures for 
amending the constitution in order to endorse collective defense forces. It was certainly not 
impossible for Abe to receive a two-thirds majority in the Diet at that time.
 By using formal procedures today, a discussion on amending the Japanese Constitution 
would be fruitful: how can we maintain a defense and security system in cooperation with 
the U.S.?
 Hasebe and Ohishi would agree that the CLB must maintain the legal stability and 
predictability of its ofﬁcial interpretation of the constitution and statutes. They diverge in the 
attitude toward the cabinet decision of ₂₀₁₄.
 Hasebe and Inoue, both former professors at Tokyo University, are in the same camp in 
arguing that the ₂₀₁₄ Abe Cabinet should have used formal procedures to amend the 
Japanese Constitution. 
 Inoue takes the opposite position. Inoue divides arguments against a constitutional 
amendment into two camps. One is a constitutional fundamentalist camp against a 
constitutional amendment. The other is the modiﬁed advocate camp that wishes to protect 
the constitution.
 According to the Inoue analysis, fundamentalists against the constitutional amendment 
advocate for unarmed neutrality and absolute paciﬁsm. Inoue thinks that this interpretation 
of Article ₉ is more persuasive than that of the modiﬁed advocates because Article ₉ clearly 
denies the use of force by the army. This is a poor explanation because the Japanese 
government endorses the existence of the SDF and the treaty for defense and security with 
the U.S. He doubts the non-violent resistance posture because it requires a serious 
commitment by the people.
 In Inoue＇s viewpoint, the modiﬁed advocates for the protection of the constitution take 
a pre-₂₀₁₄ CLB position. They argue that by using Paragraph ₂ of Article ₉, invasive war is 
147　Nihonkoku Kenpo [Kenpo][Constitution], Art. ₉₆. Amendments to this Constitution shall be 
initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each 
House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the 
afﬁrmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as 
the Diet shall specify.
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prohibited and defensive war is permissible. Its interpretation is far beyond the text of the 
constitution. Declaring that the SDF and the treaty are unconstitutional is useful and they 
limit the scope of Article ₉ in the political sphere.
 Both Inoue and Hasebe may attempt to address the reality of an unconstitutional state 
of affairs in Japan in ₂₀₁₅. By deleting Article ₉, Inoue argues that the government must 
maintain continuous discussions on defense and security under the normal legislative 
process. Without Article ₉, neither can justify the use of force for self-defense. He argues for 
the reexamination of democratic deliberation.
 Inoue believes that Japan must only act under the collective security of the U.N. He 
endorses the SDF and is against collective defense alliances with the U.S. He feels that 
Japan must be able to maintain a necessary minimum ability to defend itself. 
 Seeing the insufficient collective security system under the U.N., Inoue admits that 
there are few advantages to a treaty for defense and security with the U.S. Japan must 
commit to a collective defense system under the U.S. This would cover not only defense and 
security, but also education, culture, and preventative measures. A multifarious network for 
collective defense would be helpful for Japan.
4. The Arguments of Mizushima and Yamamoto
 There are two professors with contrasting views from Waseda and Keio Universities. 
Mizushima, from Waseda University, has argued that individual and collective defense 
powers are distinguishable and that the pre-₂₀₁₄ government invoked only individual 
defense power which is not provided in the constitution. Its text barely permits individual 
defense power and the Abe Cabinet decision in ₂₀₁₄ destroyed it.148 He argues that there is 
no overlap between individual and collective defense power.149
 A pre-₂₀₁₄ interpretation is important in the case of an immediate and imminent threat, 
for defense purposes. The constitution permits individual defense power as long as no 
alternative measure exists. It requires a minimum ability to use its self-defense power.
 The ₂₀₁₄ cabinet decision states that without an attack on Japan, in the name of 
148　ASAHO MIZUSHIMA, RAIBU KOUGI TETTEI BUNSEKI, SHUDANTEKI JIEIKEN [Live 
Lecture, Thorough Analysis, and Collective Defense Power] ₄₄- (Iwanami Shoten ₂₀₁₅). Prof. 
Mizushima published other articles as well. 
149　Id. at ₇₁.
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defense, collective defense power may be exercised. The official Japanese interpretation 
before ₂₀₁₄ permits narrower individual defense power than the power permitted by 
international law. The SDF is an exception. An attack on our nation must come ﬁrst, but this 
condition was destroyed in ₂₀₁₄. Abe induced collective defense power from the ＂inherent 
self-defense power＂ in the Sunagawa decision. Fujita, Mizushima, and Hasebe are in the 
same camp regarding the Sunagawa decision. Mizushima argues further that the Sunagawa 
decision references only inherent defense power. The CLB under the Abe administration 
induced both individual and collective defense power from this decision.
 Mizushima points out that legislative facts in support of the defense and peace statutes 
do not exists. In this case, it is nonsense for Mizushima to consider peace and defense 
statutes as policy matters outside judicial review. This political accountability lacks the 
deliberation and explanation of ₂₀₁₄. By reviewing a precise translation of the U.N. Charter, 
the Abe Cabinet believed that collective defense power was a natural right. Mizushima sees 
it as clearly erroneous to use the word ＂inherent＂ ([le] droit naturel de légitime défense, 
individuelle ou collective).150 According to Mizhushima, it is ridiculous to find that the 
peace and defense statute passed in ₂₀₁₅ permits individual defense power but not collective 
defense power.151
 Hajime Yamamoto, from Keio University, argues that it is possible to change the 
constitutional interpretation to endorse collective defense power without amending the 
constitution. 
 He denies the qualiﬁcation by the Abe Cabinet to do it. The current peace and defense 
force does not necessarily require the cabinet to obtain prior approval from the Diet in the 
absence of an attack on Japan. Collective defense power should only be exercised under the 
U.N. Charter. 
 Three new conditions for the use of force were not limited but were subject to situation 
recognition and the value judgement of the cabinet from time to time. According to 
Yamamoto, the SDF was established by way of un-constitutionalism. The CLB changed the 
interpretation of Article ₉ to permit individual defense power under which excising the 
150　Id. at ₆₂. 
151　Id. at ₇₅. See also, Fujita, supra note ₁₄₅ at ₂₉, n₁₅. See also, Souta Kimura, 
 　Anpo Hou an no doko ni Mondai ga arunoka [What is the problem of the peace and defense bills], 
KENSHO ANPO HOUAN, supra note ₁₃₅ at ₁₇-₁₈.
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necessary minimum does not constitute ＂force.＂ The SDF is in violation of Article ₉ because 
of a distorted interpretation. The national consensus was in favor of changing the 
interpretation and changing the interpretation of Article ₉ requires national consensus. The 
government needed to prove that it was time to change the interpretation of Article ₉ without 
amending the constitution. It is nonsense for Yamamoto to ask the bureaucrat in the CLB to 
preserve one interpretation of the constitution and it is not appropriate for the cabinet to 
change the head of the CLB for according to his political preference.
 Shuhen Jitai Hou152 or the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan 
in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, was revised to Juyo Eikyo Jitai Hou.153
 There is no geographical limitation for SDF activities or distinction between combat 
and non-combat regions. Yamamoto suspects these revisions reﬂect and strengthen national 
defense under change of defense circumstances. 
Conclusion
 The Japanese Constitution is now facing amendment depending on elections in the 
House of Councilors in July in ₂₀₁₆, which may accelerate the Constitutional Council and a 
national referendum.
 History shows that the Potsdam Declaration required the Japanese government to 
accept the conditions that the Japanese government surrender its armed forces and that a 
peaceful and responsible government be established by the will of the Japanese people. The 
MacArthur note illustrated that war as a sovereign right of the nation should be abolished. 
Japan renounced it ＂as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its 
own security. It relies upon higher ideals that are now stirring the world for its defense and 
its protection＂ provided in the preamble of Japanese Constitution. A Japanese Army, Navy, 
or Air Force will never be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred 
152　Shuhen Jitai ni saishite Wagakuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen wo Kakuho surutameno Sochi ni 
kansuru Houritsu (Shuhen Jitai Hou) [Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in 
Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan], Act No. ₆₀ of ₁₉₉₉.
153　Juyo Eikyo Jitai ni saishite Wagakuni no Heiwa oyobi Anzen wo Kakuho surutameno Sochi ni 
kansuru Houritsu (Juyo Eikyo Jitai Hou) [Important Inﬂuencing Situations Act], Act No. ₇₆ of ₂₀₁₅.
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upon a Japanese force.154
 The important modiﬁcation in the second paragraph of Article ₉ was made as a result 
of discussions in the Imperial Diet. Chairman Hitoshi Ashida added the text, ＂to accomplish 
the aim of the preceding paragraph.＂ The amendment by Ashida was justiﬁcation for the 
government to keep its minimum ability to defend itself with a Self-Defense Force. 
 The Abe Cabinet decision of ₂₀₁₄ changed the public interpretation and endorsed the 
power of self-defense as a right of sovereignty in the famous Sunagawa case. Most of Anzo 
Suzuki＇s students argued that the word ＂renounce＂ in Paragraph ₁ of Article ₉ meant all war 
was waived. Wars occurred in history in order to solve international disputes. Yasuo Hasebe 
proposed another interpretation that follows the pre-₂₀₁₄ public interpretation put forth by 
the CLB. The majority of Japanese constitutional law scholars are against the cabinet 
decision of ₂₀₁₄ to endorse collective defense power without an amendment of the 
constitution (Kaishaku Kaiken). It seems they believe that several patterns of attack can be 
addressed by individual defense power alone.
 The drafting history shows that there was not strong pressure for a special tribunal to 
preside over the constitutional law court during negotiations between Japan and the U.S. 
The term ＂temporary veto power＂ in SWNCC-₂₂₈ meant that the legislative body was to be 
strong. The discussion concluded that giving veto power to the Supreme Court to review 
legislation without the existence of a concrete dispute was against SWNCC-₂₈₃ and the 
Supreme Court was on able to resolve constitutional interpretation issues in concrete 
disputes over the power of the legislative body. Whether the phrase case and controversy or 
disputes on law was identical was left for the next generation of Japanese constitutional law 
scholars. Unlike in the U.S. Constitution, judicial review was stipulated in Article ₈₁ of the 
Japanese Constitution but the details regarding case and controversy were not included. 
Details regarding disputes on law are only included in the Japanese Court Act.
 If we take the National Police Reserve decision and the core of judicial power 
154　John Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Paciﬁsm, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human 
Rights, JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note ₄₂ at ₅₃.
 　Lawrence Beer, The Constitution of Japan, DANIEL FOOTE, LAW IN JAPAN ₂₆₃ (Asian Law 
Series ₂₀₀₇). ＂Should there come a time for amendment, Japan might seriously consider adding a 
third paragraph to Article ₉, forever renouncing the development, manufacture, possession, 
introduction…or use of nuclear, chemical…weapons of mass destruction. Might not Japan then 
credibly urge others to do likewise? Any progress in that direction would be victory for humankind.＂
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seriously, it would be unconstitutional to establish a constitutional tribunal with abstract 
judicial review powers independent of the regular hierarchy of the judiciary. This would 
overturns important constitutional precedent. Parliament even discussed a proposal to amend 
the Court Act to delete the phrase ＂disputes on law＂ and to add a new procedure for abstract 
judicial review in time of the National Police Reserve decision. 
 The Nagoya high court has the advantage that the judiciary maintains its authority and 
power of judicial review and encourages the legislature to review statutes regarding Article 
₉. The court held there was no infringement on the right to live in peace but it recognized 
this right through legal norms. 
 Japanese constitutional law scholars must study not only Article ₉ but intra-factional 
conflicts within the political party as well and review if the leader of the political party 
reflects the will of the voters. Japanese constitutional studies should focus on cabinet 
leadership because the Meiji government lost control as a result of interference from the 
military in events such as the ₂₂₆  coup d＇État (the February ₂₆ incident) in ₁₉₃₆. 
 Cabinet meetings are not stipulated in the Japanese Constitution. Decision-making is 
autonomous and beyond judicial review. Unfortunately, the judiciary is only a passive 
branch. It avoids unnecessary political disputes and it cannot review its autonomy through 
cabinet meetings or committee deliberations. However, there might be room for it to review 
issues such as the infringement of human rights.
 In ₂₀₁₄, the Abe Administration created three new conditions to make defense power 
permissible under Article ₉. First, an attack on Japan must occur, a nation in a close 
relationship with Japan must be attacked, the existence of the Japanese nation must be 
endangered, or it must be clear that life, liberty, and the right to the pursuit of happiness is 
threatened. Second, there must be no alternative measures to preventing the attack, 
preserving the nation, or protecting the people. Third, its exercise must meet the necessary 
minimum requirements.
 This likely refers to an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in a threat to 
Japan＇s survival. The Abe Cabinet＇s goals are to permit the SDF to dispose of underwater 
mines in the Strait of Hormuz, to intercept missiles targeting the U.S., and to search and 
inspect suspected ships. It is not clear how the government will address general economic 
crises.
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 The SDF may carry fuel, conduct aerial refueling, transport goods to the U.S. army, 
clean up interferences in the South China Sea, and maintain sea lanes. The opposition party 
complained that this logistical support raises the risk of wars where the Japanese SDF may 
be involved. 
 The most important changes were the removal of the limitation of an exclusively 
defensive security policy known as Senshu Bouei and geographic limits. SDF activities are 
controlled by parliament and the degree of control varies under ten defense and peace 
statutes enacted in ₂₀₁₅. These statutes show how the representative legislature controls the 
cabinet and the supreme commander of the SDF as well as the prime minister through the 
use of the Japanese Constitution.
 By citing statements made by members of the Diet, Ohishi argues that the CLB 
endorsed the existence of collective defense power but denied the exercise thereof. He stated 
that the CLB should show persuasive grounds for collective defense power well before 
₂₀₁₄.
 Fujita states that the ₂₀₁₄ cabinet decision was an irrational political action and 
constitutional law scholars expressed strong criticism against the Abe Cabinet. He regrets 
that the majority of public law professors have not made consistent sophisticated analyses.
 According to Inoue, exclusively defensive security policy known as Senshu Bouei was 
the subject of a constitutional amendment without using amendment procedures (Kaishaku 
Kaiken). Hasebe and Inoue argue that by changing the public interpretation of the 
constitution without using formal amendment procedures (Kaishaku Kaiken), the core of 
constitutionalism was circumvented. 
 Both Inoue and Hasebe may try to address the reality of an unconstitutional state of 
affairs in Japan. By deleting Article ₉, Inoue argues that the government must maintain 
continuous discussions on defense and security under a normal legislative process.
 Hajime Yamamoto argues that it is possible to change the constitutional interpretation 
to endorse collective defense power without amending the constitution. He denies the 
qualiﬁcations of the Abe Cabinet to change constitutional interpretation. It is nonsense for 
Yamamoto to ask bureaucrats in the CLB to preserve one interpretation of the constitution.
 Mizushima argues that Article ₉ text barely permits individual defense power. The 
constitution permits individual defense power as long as no alternative measure exists. Pre-
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₂₀₁₄ official interpretation permits narrower individual defense power than the power 
permitted by international law.
 Article ₉ as well as other notions such as legislative control over the cabinet, the 
civilian clause, special military tribunals, autonomy of other governmental branches under 
judiciary review, and sovereignty should be reviewed. Japanese constitutional scholars in 
Japan should bridge the gap between constitutional law texts and people＇s understanding and 
talk with other scholars and governmental officials about defense and security issues in 
international deliberations. This supports the goal of the rule of law in Japan to maintain 
universal values in its constitution.
(Associate Professor, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences)
